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BENSON v. BENSON
mitted under other involuntary commitment procedures."9
Since the basis of their confinement is that they are a
potential threat to society, upon petition for release it must
be determined whether, if discharged, they will be able to
take a place in society without becoming a menace to the
welfare of themselves and the society in which they will
live. Thus, the test to be applied in these cases of release,
regardless of the method of confinement, is the test applied
by the trial Court and adopted by the Court of Appeals
in the instant case.20
FURTHER ON VOLUNTARY SEPARATION AS
A GROUND FOR ABSOLUTE DIVORCE
Benson v. Benson'
By LuoNARD BLOOM*
This case is significant in that it departs from a previous
viewpoint of the Maryland Court of Appeals, and it does
so by the narrowest of margins, 3 to 2. In an action for
divorce a vinculo matrimonii, where the plaintiff relies
upon the statutory grounds of 3 years voluntary separation
between the parties, the question is here presented as to
whether the separated parties must have had a mutual in-
tent at the time of their separation not to resume marital
relations thereafter, in order that an absolute divorce de-
cree will issue. Secondly, and collateral to this, can the
parties at the time of their separation recognize or acknowl-
edge the possibility of a future reconciliation, or will such
an acknowledgment defeat the "voluntary" aspects of their
separation?
"-See Wells v Attorney General of the United States, 201 F. 2d 556, 559
(10th Cir., 1953), where it is said:
"The several states in their character as parens patriae have general
power and are under the general duty of caring for insane persons.
The prerogative is a segment of police power. In the exercise of such
power, insane persons may be restrained and confined both for the
welfare of themselves and for the protection of the public. And if the
exactions of due process are met, such restraint and confinement do
not violate any constitutional right of the individual."
9 Essentially the same policy underlies discharge from the Patuxent In-
stitute under the Defective Delinquent law. Md. Code (1951), Art. 31B.
* Second Year Evening Student, University of Maryland School of Law.
1204 Md. 601, 105 A. 2d 733 (1954). For earlier notes on this subject, see
Five Years Voluntary Separation As New Ground For Absolute Divorce,
2 Md. L. Rev. 357 (1938), and supplementary note thereto in 7 Md. L. Rev.
146 (1943).
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In this particular case,2 the wife filed suit for an absolute
divorce, alleging as grounds at least 3 years voluntary
separation between the parties. The parties were married
in 1944 and thereafter lived with the husband's parents on
the parental farm. Marital difficulties arose, the wife not
being content to live with her in-laws; and in July of 1949,
the wife asked her husband to take her to her sister's house,
which was 5 miles away. The husband consented. He drove
his wife to her sister's house, and the wife took certain be-
longings with her. She commented that she was sorry "it
worked out this way". Her husband asked her if she could
see any other way out, and she commented that "right now
I don't". The wife testified that she and her husband
couldn't figure any other way out, and that they decided
to try it "this way". There was further evidence that the
husband believed a separation "to be the only solution
for now".
Later, the wife moved to Baltimore, and in 1951 her
husband went to see her to inform her that should she re-
turn to the farm, his parents would forgive her. Since the
friction created from living with her in-laws originally
precipitated her marital difficulties, the wife was not at all
anxious to accept an offer to reconcile which would impose
substantially the same intolerable conditions. She refused
to return. On January 2, 1953, a written agreement was
prepared and was signed and sworn to by the husband only.
The agreement recited that "the parties hereto are now
and have been for some time past living separate and
apart"; and it provided that the parties would thereafter
live separate and apart, and that neither would seek resti-
tution or enforcement of conjugal rights. The agreement
also contained a property settlement. The agreement was
executed by the husband only and not by the wife. It also
stated that the wife was to file suit for a divorce, but the
grounds were not stated.
Thereafter, the wife filed suit for a divorce a vinculo
matrimonii. She had a copy of the separation agreement
executed by her husband; but it was not admitted in evi-
dence, and the divorce decree was denied. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed and ruled that the separation
agreement was a sworn recognition or admission by the
husband of the state of affairs between the parties at the
time, and for that limited purpose it was relevant and
should have been admitted.
I Ibid.
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However, even if the agreement is admitted in evidence
it was at the most, merely a recognition of the state of
affairs between the parties as of the time of its execution;
since the term "have been for some time past living sepa-
rate and apart" is too nebulous to sustain the wife's cause
of action. Therefore, it was essential to the wife's suit to
comply fully with the statute' and to prove that the separa-
tion was "voluntary" at its inception. Hence, the case turns
upon the interpretation given to the particular Maryland
statute4 which sets out as grounds for am absolute divorce,
3 years of voluntary separation between the parties.
The Maryland statute in question is Article 16, Section
33 (Code of 1951), and the applicable portion included by
an amendment in 1937, reads as follows:
".... the Court may decree a divorce a vinculo matri-
monii... when the husband and wife shall have volun-
tarily lived separate and apart, without any cohabita-
tion, for three consecutive years prior to the filing of
the bill of complaint, and such separation is beyond
any reasonable expectation of reconciliation; . . ."
The first case dealing with this statute was Campbell v.
Campbell.' That case did not undertake to clearly define
the meaning of the term "voluntary separation" because
the main issue dealt with the constitutionality of the statute
where the separation period occurred before the statute
was passed. Not only did the Court of Appeals construe the
statute to apply, but considered that the wife's tacit recog-
nition and compliance with a formal separation agreement
negated her contention that she was coerced into executing
that agreement.
The case of France v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.' war-
rants a much closer examination, however. There, the
Court of Appeals undertook to define "voluntary" when
they said:
".... a voluntary separation is a physical separation
of the parties, by common consent with a common in-
tent not to resume marital relations. It does not mean
a mere physical separation7 . .
Md. Oode (1951), Art. 16, Sec. 33.
4 Ibid.
5174 Md. 229, 198 A. 414 (1938), noted, 2 Md. L. Rev. 357 (1938).
'176 Md. 306, 4 A. 2d 717 (1939).
'Ibid, 325.
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The Court went on to say that the word "voluntary" con-
notes an agreement, and that unless the parties agree to
live apart the separation cannot be voluntary.
In the France case,8 the facts were these: The husband
advised his wife to accompany her mother to Italy for a
rest and to visit her ailing sister. The husband secured all
the accommodations for his wife and saw her off at the
dock. The wife testified that the husband never mentioned
that he desired her to stay in Europe permanently, and
that she had every reason to believe that the separation
would be a temporary one and that eventually the parties
would be reunited. He testified that he told her the separa-
tion would be final. Once the wife arrived in Europe, the
parties exchanged frequent letters. The husband repeat-
edly professed his love for his wife, his regret at their
separation, and his desire to have his wife return; but he
did nothing whatsoever to hasten her return. In fact, he
prolonged it. Although he supported his wife adequately
while she was in Europe, he declined to send her sufficient
money for her home passage. His wife was in poor health,
of a nervous temperament, and somewhat unstable men-
tally. Her husband was a doctor and well aware of her
condition. By virtue of his professional knowledge and his
own personal experience, he realized that it would be in-
advisable for his wife to travel alone. She continually ex-
pressed her desire to return to the United States, but her
husband did not arrange for her safe travel. Instead, he
waited until the necessary statutory period was over, and
shortly thereafter filed suit for an absolute divorce alleging
as grounds, voluntary separation between the parties.
The Court of Appeals, in refusing the absolute divorce,
commented that the parties must have at the time of their
separation, a common intent not to resume marital relations
thereafter.
The later Maryland cases9 all pay homage to France v.
Safe Deposit and Trust Co. and reiterate in whole or in part
the doctrine that a mutual intent at the time of separation
(or sometime thereafter) not to resume marital relations
in the future is a necessary condition precedent that must
be fulfilled in order to obtain an absolute divorce for volun-
S9upra, n. 6.
"Miller v. Miller, 178 Md. 12, 11 A. 2d 630 (1940) ; Kline v. Kline, 179
Md. 10, 16 A. 2d 924 (1940) ; Beck v. Beck, 180 Md. 321, 24 A. 2d 295 (1942),
noted 7 Md. L. Rev. 146 (1943) ; Nichols v. Nichols, 181 Md. 392, 30 A. 2d
446 (1943), noted 7 Md. L. Rev. 146 (1943) ; Kruse v. Kruse, 183 Md. 369,
37 A. 2d 898 (1944) ; Foote v. Foote, 190 Md. 171, 57 A. 2d 804 (1948) ; Hahn
v. Hahn, 192 Md. 561, 64 A. 2d 739 (1949).
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tary separation, that in the absence of such a mutual or
common intent an absolute divorce decree will not issue,
and that the present three year statutory period of volun-
tary separation starts from the time such a mutual intent is
manifested between the parties.
These later cases 10 all contain a strong element of deser-
tion, in which one of the parties files suit for an absolute
divorce on grounds of desertion or abandonment," and the
other party counters with a suit for an absolute divorce on
grounds of voluntary separation, or vice-versa. In either
event, the suit on the ground of voluntary separation is
used as a defensive measure to negate the allegations of
desertion presented by the other party. Each suit tends to
counter-act the other, because desertion by its very nature
presupposes that the separation was involuntary as to the
plaintiff.
The Beck case, 2 is particularly interesting and in many
respects closely akin to the principal case of Benson v.
Benson,3 noted herein. In the Beck case 4 the husband con-
tinued to live in the same house, but deserted the bed of
his wife. This is recognized in Maryland as a form of con-
structive desertion such that after the statutory period of
18 months has elapsed, an absolute divorce decree may
issue." Six months after the husband's act of constructive
desertion had occurred, the wife left the home. Then, after
a period of about 9 years, the wife brought suit for an abso-
lute divorce decree, alleging as grounds, voluntary separa-
tion. The decree was denied, and properly so. The theory of
a voluntary separation is entirely opposed to desertion,
where the separation is considered involuntary as to the
party deserted.
Now, the principal case noted is closely parallel to the
Beck case, in that the failure of the husband to provide a
domicile separate from his parents' is regarded in Maryland
as a form of constructive desertion. 6 But whereas the wife
in the Beck case 17 walked out on her husband after he had
constructively deserted her, the departure of the wife in
the principal case was consented to and aided by the hus-
band. The separation therefore acquires the character of
2l Ibid.
u Md. Code (1951), Art. 33, Sec. 16.
Supra, n. 9.
18 Supra, n. 1.
14 Supra, ns. 9, 12.
"Fleegle v. Fleegle, 136 Md. 630, 110 A. 889 (1920) ; Hoffhines v. Hoff-
hines, 146 Md. 350, 126 A. 112, 38 A. L. R. 332 (1924).
Ewing v. Ewing, 154 Md. 84, 140 A. 37 (1928).
Supra, ns. 9, 12.
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a voluntary one; and it is in this regard that the principal
case may be distinguished from the Beck case, 8 where
the final separation was unilateral as far as the wife was
concerned.
The interpretation of Article 16, Section 33, concerning
voluntary separation as a ground for an absolute divorce
as laid down in the France case,'9 and as quoted in the suc-
ceeding cases, requires that the parties manifest a common
intent not to resume marital relations in the future in order
that the statute shall apply. The principal case removes
the necessity for such a rigid intent element and in a sense
qualifies it by requiring that the parties have merely a
common intent to separate and not necessarily an intent to
remain forever separated. Under the majority view in the
principal case,20 the mere acknowledgment of a possible
reconciliation in the future, actually the possible occur-
rence of a condition subsequent sometime after the physical
separation of the parties, does not preclude the statutory
period from commencing as of the separation; and likewise,
does not defeat the voluntary aspects of the separation.
The Chief Judge and one associate judge dissented on
the grounds that as the France2 case had previously inter-
preted the statute,22 any modification of that interpretation
should be dictated by public policy considerations, and that
expressions of public policy are more properly voiced by
the legislature.
However, a rule of law extracted from a particular
factual situation may not necessarily be valid where a
critical fact is either included or deleted. Boiled down to
its bare essentials, the leading France case2" involves a
physical separation of the parties where at least the wife
fully intended to return at a future date, coupled with the
future acts of her husband in prolonging the separation by
refusing to secure adequate passage. Now too, in the prin-
cipal case,24 the husband prolonged the separation by his
failure to provide a separate domicile; also, whereas in the
France case25 one of the parties definitely expected to re-
turn in the future, neither of the parties in the principal
case had any more than a hazy hope of reconciling in the
future. Yet, because they "left the door open" so to speak,
11 Supra, ns. 9, 12.
"176 Md. 306, 4 A. 2d 717 (1939).20Supra, n. 1.
0 Supra, ns. 6, 19.
" Md. Code (1951), Art. 16, Sec. 33.
=Supra, ns. 6, 19.
"Supra, n. 1.
-Supra, ns. 6, 19.
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for a future reconciliation, the dissenting opinion holds that
their voluntary separation was of a character insufficient
to qualify the parties for an absolute divorce.
It is respectfully submitted, however, that the France
case,26 although correct under its particular factual situa-
tion, actually went too far and laid down a broad rule of
law not applicable to the principal case. Moreover, it ap-
pears that the principal case is just the type of case the
legislature had in mind when the statute2" was passed.
The statute provides for an 18 month "cooling-off" period
during which time the parties may reconsider that their
marriage of long standing should not be dissolved by a
hasty, ill-advised divorce. The very purpose of the statute
is to encourage the separated parties to make amends and
attempt to reconcile their differences; if the parties at the
time of separating recognize the possibility of such a future
reconciliation, they should not thereafter be penalized for
their failure to reconcile. The reasoning of the dissenting
opinion will tend to obviate the very purpose of the statute,
and it is respectfully submitted that the majority of the
Court of Appeals, adopted a more realistic approach in the
principal case, by eliminating the requirement of "a com-
mon intent not to resume marital relations", which was
engrafted on the statute by the France case.
EASEMENT IMPLIED BY REFERENCE TO A PLAT
Klein v. Dove 1
By Ci oSOpmEm H. FoR1MAN*
Plaintiffs-appellees filed a bill in equity to enjoin the
defendants-appellants from obstructing an alleged right of
way leading to a beach and lake area. Plaintiffs and defen-
dants are each owners of lots in a fifty-acre waterfront de-
velopment, having derived title from a common grantor.
The lots were described in a plat duly recorded, showing the
location of the lots, various projected streets or roads, three
piers, and the lake and lake area. Among the roads shown
on the recorded plat of the development, a ten-foot road or
right of way appears along one side of defendants' lot. This
Ibid.
2Supra, n. 22.
* Third Year Evening Student, University of Maryland School of Law.
205 Md. 285, 107 A. 2d 82 (1954).
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